Notes on Contributors viii Preface to the Second Edition xiii Preface to the First Edition xiv 1 Should Knowledge Come First? 1 Knowledge First Timothy Williamson 1 What Is Knowledge-first Epistemology? Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew 10 Experience First Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew 17 Knowledge Still First Timothy Williamson 22 Still Nowhere Else to Start Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew 25 2 Is Knowledge Closed under Known Entailment? 27 The Case against Closure Fred Dretske 27 The Case for Closure John Hawthorne 40 Reply to Hawthorne Fred Dretske 56 3 Is Knowledge Contextual? 60 Contextualism Contested Earl Conee 60 Contextualism Defended Stewart Cohen 69 Contextualism Contested Some More Earl Conee 75 Contextualism Defended Some More Stewart Cohen 79 4 Do Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know? 84 Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath 84 Practical Matters Do Not Affect Whether You Know Baron Reed 95 5 Can Skepticism Be Refuted? 107 The Refutation of Skepticism Jonathan Vogel 108 The Challenge of Refuting Skepticism Richard Fumerton 120 6 Are Intellectually Virtuous Motives Essential to Knowledge? 133 Knowledge Need Not Be Virtuously Motivated Jason Baehr 133 Knowledge and the Motive for Truth Linda Zagzebski 140 Reply to Zagzebski Jason Baehr 146 Reply to Baehr Linda Zagzebski 149 7 Can Knowledge Be Lucky? 152 Knowledge Cannot Be Lucky Duncan Pritchard 152 Knowledge Can Be Lucky Stephen Hetherington 164 8 Is There a Priori Knowledge? 177 In Defense of the a Priori Laurence BonJour 177 There Is No a Priori Michael Devitt 185 Reply to Devitt Laurence BonJour 195 Reply to BonJour Michael Devitt 197 Last Rejoinder Laurence BonJour 200 9 Is There Immediate Justification? 202 There Is Immediate Justification James Pryor 202 There Is no Immediate Justification Juan Comesana 222 Reply to Comesana James Pryor 235 Reply to Pryor Juan Comesana 239 10 Can Belief Be Justified Through Coherence Alone? 244 Non-foundationalist Epistemology: Holism, Coherence, and Tenability Catherine Z. Elgin 244 Why Coherence Is Not Enough: A Defense of Moderate Foundationalism James Van Cleve 255 Reply to Van Cleve Catherine Z. Elgin 267 Reply to Elgin James Van Cleve 271 11 Is Infinitism the Solution to the Regress Problem? 274 Infinitism Is the Solution to the Regress Problem Peter Klein 274 Infinitism Is Not the Solution to the Regress Problem Carl Ginet 283 Reply to Ginet Peter Klein 291 Reply to Klein Carl Ginet 295 12 Can Evidence Be Permissive? 298 Evidence Can Be Permissive Thomas Kelly 298 Evidence Cannot Be Permissive Roger White 312 13 Is Justification Internal? 324 Justification Is Not Internal John Greco 325 Justification Is Internal Richard Feldman 337 14 Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal? 351 Truth Is Not the Primary Epistemic Goal Jonathan L. Kvanvig 352 Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis Marian David 363 Index 378
Matthias Steup is Professor of Philosophy at PurdueUniversity, USA, where he is head of the Department of Philosophy.A specialist in epistemology, he is a widely published author andeditor. Previous work includes A Companion toEpistemology (co-edited with Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa,Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, second edition), the first edition ofContemporary Debates in Epistemology (co-edited with ErnestSosa, Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), and Knowledge, Truth andDuty (2001). John Turri is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at theUniversity of Waterloo, Canada. A specialist in epistemology andthe philosophy of language, he has published dozens of articles onthese topics in leading journals such as PhilosophicalReview, Nous, Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch, Analysis, and Philosophical Studies. Hecurrently holds an Early Researcher Award from the Ontario Ministryof Economic Development and Innovation. Ernest Sosa is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophyat Rutgers University, USA. He has published books and articles inepistemology, including Knowledge inPerspective (1991), Epistemic Justification(with Laurence BonJour, Blackwell, 2003), A VirtueEpistemology (2007), ReflectiveKnowledge (2009), and Knowing FullWell (2011).
?When Blackwell published the first edition of Contemporary Debates in Epistemology in 2005, that volume very quickly became epistemology's superego: it expressed the ideals that were implicit in the best recent epistemological work, and it served to guide both practicing and apprenticing epistemologists to the questions that mattered most to the field back then. Of course, the questions that matter most in 2013 are not exactly the same as those that mattered most in 2005; thus, the need for a new edition. I expect that this new edition ? which contains units on the now widely discussed issues of whether knowledge is epistemologically fundamental, whether practical concerns encroach on epistemic status, whether evidential justification is permissive, what sort of epistemic luck (if any) is incompatible with knowledge ? will serve to guide epistemological practice for the next several years, and with at least as much authority as the first edition. The contributors are among the most prominent in the field, and their contributions represent some of the best work being done on the topics under discussion. If you want to contribute to the most important epistemological conversations today, you will need to read this book.? ?Ram Neta, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Praise for the First Edition ?This book is packed with cutting-edge epistemology by excellent contributors to the field. It is both comprehensive and admirably brief.? ? Robert Audi, University of Notre Dame ?What are the burning problems of today?s epistemology? What are the most promising solutions to these problems? They are all in this timely volume, explained and debated by leading authorities.? ?Alvin Goldman, Rutgers University ?With leading and emerging figures in epistemology debating some of its most fundamental questions, this volume will be required reading for anyone interested in where the theory of knowledge has been and where it is going. A superb collection.? ?Paul Boghossian, New York University