Introduction: Seeing John Malkovich The Content View Why does it matter whether the Rich Content View is true? How can we decide whether the Rich Content View is true? Part I: Contents Chapter 1: Experiences 1.1 States of seeing and phenomenal states 1.2 Visual perceptual experiences Chapter 2: The Content View 2.1 Contents as accuracy conditions 2.2 The Argument from Accuracy 2.3 A flaw in the Argument from Accuracy 2.4 The Argument from Appearing 2.5 Two objections from 'looks', 'appears' and their cognates 2.6 The significance of the Content View Chapter 3: How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience? 3.1 Introspection 3.2 Naturalistic theories of content 3.3 The method of phenomenal contrast Part II: Properties Chapter 4: Kinds 4.1 The examples 4.2 The premises 4.3 Content externalism Chapter 5: Causation 5.1 The Causal Thesis 5.2 Michotte's results 5.3 Unity in experience 5.4 Non-causal contents 5.5 Raw feels 5.6 Non-sensory experiences Part III: Objects Chapter 6: The Role of Objects in the Contents of Experience 6.1 Strong and Weak Veridicality 6.2 The contents of states of seeing 6.3 The contents of phenomenal states 6.4 Phenomenal states: Internalism vs. Pure Disjunctivism 6.5 Why Internalism? Chapter 7: Subject and Object in the Contents of Experience 7.1 Subject-independence and Perspectival Connectedness 7.2 The Good and the Odd 7.3 Complex contents 7.4 Objections and replies Chapter 8: The Strong Content View revisited
Susanna Siegel is Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. She has been named 2012 Walter Channing Cabot Fellow.
"Siegel's book is an important contribution to the contemporary literature on the nature and structure of perception, particularly on the topic of what is sometimes called 'the admissible contents of experience' (the question of which properties we experience in perception). "--James Genone, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews "This is one of the most significant books in philosophy of mind for many years. There are three big ideas in it. One is a novel argument for the conclusion that perceptual experiences have representational content. Siegel makes a persuasive case that this argument applies even to all but the most radical of those who take themselves to be opposed to representational views of perception. The second is a set of arguments that these contents of perception are 'rich' in that they go beyond color, shape, illumination, motion, and space. Perceptual experiences represent such properties as being a dog, being a pine tree and even being John Malkovich. The third big idea is a method for adjudicating the contents of perception, the method of phenomenal contrast. This method is of considerable value whether or not one accepts Siegel's conclusions. This book is illuminating, convincing and also wonderfully clear and fun to read."--Ned Block, New York University