Acknowledgments ix Introduction 1 Chapter 1 Theories of Intentions and the Problem of Attention 14 Chapter 2 I ndicators of Nazi Germany's Intentions and the Coming of World War II, 1934-39 44 Chapter 3 British Decision Makers' Perceptions of Nazi Germany's Intentions 58 Chapter 4 The British Intelligence Community's Assessments of Nazi Germany's Intentions 102 Chapter 5 The Carter Era and the Collapse of Detente, 1977-80 114 Chapter 6 US Decision Makers' Perceptions of Soviet Intentions: The Collapse of Detente 126 Chapter 7 The US Intelligence Community's Assessments of Soviet Intentions: The Collapse of Detente 158 Chapter 8 I ndicators of Soviet Intentions and the End of the Cold War, 1985-88 178 Chapter 9 US Decision Makers' Perceptions of Soviet Intentions: The End of the Cold War 192 Chapter 10 The US Intelligence Community's Assessments of Soviet Intentions: The End of the Cold War 224 Chapter 11 S ummary and Implications 241 Appendix: Summary of Hypotheses 255 Notes 259 Index 345
Keren Yarhi-Milo is assistant professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University.
Co-Winner of the 2016 DPLST Book Prize, Diplomatic Studies Section of the International Studies Association Winner, 2014 Edgar S. Furniss Book Award, Mershon Center for International Security Studies "[Knowing the Adversary] enriches the debate over the best way for policymakers and analysts to filter the vast pools of information they gather about rivals."--Foreign Affairs "[A] solid scholarly book...The major contribution of the book is the systematic focus on a notoriously amorphous subject--how world leaders and intelligence organizations draw inferences about their adversaries' long-term intentions."--Choice "Knowing the Adversary is a great success: it is thoroughly researched, well written, convincing in its conclusions, and rich in policy implications of the highest security importance."--Mark L. Haas, Political Science Quarterly