Sauer sinks a sharp plow into some of the most fertile ground in our field: understanding moral judgment not as a competition between reason and intuition, but rather as a synthesis of them. The fruits are ours to read. -- Fiery Cushman, Assistant Professor of Psychology, Harvard University Are moral beliefs impervious to reason? Are moral judgments constituted by emotions? Many philosophers and psychologists think we are forced to answer these questions affirmatively by empirical evidence. Hanno Sauer shows that while particular moral judgments are typically made on the basis of automatic intuitions, the intuitions themselves are educable, and reasoning -- especially with others -- plays an important role in this. The attractive rationalism he defends acknowledges the pervasive role of emotions in moral judgments, while nevertheless opening the way for genuine moral error and moral progress. Without doubt, this book is a major contribution to empirically informed metaethics and moral psychology. -- Neil Levy, Macquarie University; Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford
Hanno Sauer is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Utrecht University.