Table of Contents

I. REALISM AND ITS CRITICS
1: The Non-cognitivist Challenge
2: The Constructivist Challenge
II. MORAL METAPHYSICS
3: Ethical Non-naturalism
4: Supervenience and Causation
III. MORAL MOTIVATION
5: Motivational Humeanism
6: Motivational Judgement Internalism
IV. MORAL REASONS
7: Reasons Internalism
8: Moral Rationalism
9: Rationality and Disagreement
V. MORAL KNOWLEDGE
10: Moral Scepticism
11: The Justification of Moral Principles
12: The Justification of Verdictive Beliefs
References
Index

Reviews

Moral Realism: A Defense is highly accessible, and Shafer-Landau does a remarkable job of navigating difficult arguments in the domain of meta-ethics and of metaphysics and epistemology. It is an excellent text to include in upper-level undergraduate courses in meta-ethics as well as in graduate seminars. 'Analytical metaethics is an area where a great deal of ingenuity is currently required in order to find a distinctive yet plausible position to defend at any length. In this book, Russ Shafer-Landau demonstrates that the task remains possible. Over 300 pages or so, he defends an unorthodox combination of claims, including anti-Humeanism about reasons for action, mind-independent moral realism, moral non-naturalism, moral rationalism, and reliabilist moral epistemology. Shafer-Landaus book will be useful to any student of philosophy who wants to gain a synoptic view of contemporary metaethics, and also to professionals with a stake in the many ongoing debates to which the book makes valuable contributions.' Hallvard Lillehammer, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews A book of remarkable scope and ambition ... clear and engaging throughout ... [Shafer-Landau] develops a number of novel arguments for what is sure to be a controversial set of mutually supporting and philosophically interesting positions... very much worth reading. It is also accessible and engaging enough to be useful for teaching advanced undergraduates. Michael Ridge, Australasian Journal of Philosophy